Ahstract-Recently, the major challenge in the robustness evaluation of networks is to enhance the detecting the most critical nodes. Many researchers have studied the problem of detecting the list of attacked nodes, which are the number of failed nodes is maximum, in order to protect these nodes. However, there is no any previous works to consider the cost of attacks that the budget is limited is very practical in the real attacks. In this paper, we study the problem of attacking nodes in networks to maximize the total profits of attacked nodes, where the total cost of attacks is remained under the budget. In addition, an algorithm is proposed to solve problem of attacking nodes in the network with limited budget while guaranteeing the high total profits of attacked nodes. Simulation results show that the proposed method provides good performance.
I. INTRODUCTION Nowadays, networks consist of many components established complex systems, where each parts can effect to the performance of other parts in the network [1]- [16] . Many networks are extremely vulnerable to be attacked that the failures of a few nodes may lead to a much more devastating consequence. The maintaining the networks connectivity then can be broken down their operation. The failure nodes can redistribute its loading to its neighbors that it can make the loading of its neighbors over the tolerance level. This is known as cascading failure. There are two possible happened cases when a node is failed. The first one, its neighbors are overloaded and failed after receiving an additional loads from its failure. The second one, its neighbor increases the total loading but not enough to fail. Despite no failure in node after first wave attack, the increment of its loads is higher impact that it is high probability of failure in next wave attacks. This is because there is co-impact of attacked buses to trigger the cascading failure. For any above reasons, the network is also easy broken down its operation. Therefore, detecting critical nodes that is vulnerable in network is a main issue that we address in this paper.
The cascading failure has received a lot of attention and been studied in previous works [17] , [18] . To evaluate network scale and network security, many researches on analysis and assessing network vulnerability have been conducted. Most of previous researches focused on using centrality measurement to assess network vulnerability, such as clustering coefficient, degree distribution, and diameter to evaluate its vulnerability under attacks [19] , [20] , [21] . In [22] , authors first model the objective network such as the set of vertices/edges to input into general graph which then the vulnerability assessment is converted into a graphtheoretical optimization problem, termed (3 -disT'uptoT' problem including two versions (3 -veT'texdisT'uptoT' and (3 -edgedisT'uptoT'. Recently, In [23] , the authors focused on achieving the maximum number of failed nodes to evaluate the robustness level of network. By this way, they have to figure out the most critical nodes in network and try to take down most of them. Some researchers [24] , they recognize there is co-impact between be taken down nodes, they then try to find out the order list of potential attacked nodes. On the other hand, In [25] , the authors tried to attack the network links instead of attacking nodes. However, there is no any previous works to consider the cost of attacks that the budget is limited is very practical in the real attacks.
In the paper, we study the problem of detecting the relevant list of attacked nodes for maximizing total profits of attacked nodes under the limited budget in networks. In addition, an algorithm is proposed for the problem. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the network model. The algorithm is proposed in Section IV. In Section V, the performance of the proposed method is evaluated in terms of the total profits. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude this paper.
II. SYSTE M MODEL
For the network model, we use a weighted graph G(V, E) to represent our network model as follows: n nodes E node set V. We set a weight w (u , v) to any edge (u , v) that represents the operating parameter of the network. The higher is w ( u , v) , the more load is distributed from node u to v. In addition, each node u has a current load f!( u) and a capacity <5 ( u). We also assume that there is no any loading value such as power or voltage drop during transmitting between nodes (the performance of transmission line is 100%). If the loading on node u, f! (u) exceeds o(u) , the node u will be failed. Moreover, we denote the set of neighbors of u by Nu that connect to u by undirected edges. Finally, let p( u) and p( u) denote the cost and profit of node u which is used to take down the node u and the important operating at node u, respectively. The higher is p( u), the more important operating is located at u . This assumption is reasonable since it is different security level for different importance level at different node that attackers have to consume to take down nodes.
For the cascading failure model, when bus node u is failed by attackers, its load is redistributed to its neighbors. Each bus node v that is u 's neighbor, will be received an additional load. The additional load is defined as follows:
be an undirected weighted graph, where V, E is a set of nodes, and a set of edges, respectively. In graph G, every edge (u , v) E E has a weight value, w(u,v); every node u E V has a load value and capacity value, f! (u) , and o(u), respectively. In addition, to take down each node u, the attackers have to consider to the cost value, and profit value of node u, are denoted as p( u) and p( u), respectively.
Given G(V, E, f!, 0, p, w, p), and a positive integer budget, the Weighted-Critical-Nodes Attack problem is finding a order subset I <;;; V such that the total cost of attacks is not greater than budget, and the total profit of failed nodes caused by the attacked nodes in I is maximum, which is illustrated as follows:
, budget, and a positive integer x .
QUESTION: Does there exist a order nodes I <;;; V in G such that the total cost of attacked nodes is not greater than budget, and the total profit of failed nodes J1D(I) caused by the attacked node in I is not less than x?
IV. SOLUTIONS
The key to our problem is determined the most suitable nodes in I that the total profit of failed nodes caused by attacked node in I is maximum under the limited budgets. To evaluate the vulnerability of networks under the load redistribution, most of previous works focus on the higher degree nodes in the network or the number of failed nodes caused by initial attacks, may miss the most critical nodes. Note that there are two possible happened cases when a node u is failed. The first one, u's neighbors are overloaded and be failed after receiving an additional loads from its failure, denoted by set lFu . The second one, u's neighbor, node v increases the total loads f! ( v ) but not enough to fail. Despite no failure in node v after first wave attack, the increment of its loads is higher impact that it is high probability of failure in next wave attacks. This is because there is coimpact of attacked nodes to trigger the cascading failure.
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Although the loads impact of earlier attacked nodes is not enough to make failure, the load of remaining nodes is close to the its capacity. Thus, later attacked node can make it to fail easier.
In addition, there is no any previous works considering to the cost of attacks that is very practical in the real attacks. To avoid this scenario, we define a new metric to evaluate the importance of nodes more comprehensively for every nodes v E V, called the average impact value per incremental attack cost of u, denoted by I Pu . The I Pu is defined as follows:
Where IF u is denoted for set of failed node cased by u.
It is clear that we can use the matrix 2 directly to find the potential buses that is the fastest way to approach our problem to get maximum profit of failure nodes in the network. By using initially computing the impact value per incremental attack cost of nodes. Every node u is then can be sorted in the order of non-decreasing impact value I Pu ::; . .. ::; I PUn . While the total attacked cost does not exceed budget, the top nodes with highest value I P are selected as attacked nodes. It is run fast, but it seems to be lost the overlap impact evaluation of nodes. If both two nodes U i and Uj have impact on bus Ut , the evaluation of I P value of nodes is not fair initially. When Ui is first selected, node Uj has no impact on U t as U t is already failed. By the metric, we propose more practical algorithm, called the Practically Impact based algorithm (PlEA). In each iteration of the PlEA, we evaluate every node U i' S I P Ui . Then the node, which has the next higher average practically impact value per incremental cost, is considered to be added into I. The detailed impact-based algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 PlEA (G(V, E,f!,o,p,w,p), budget )
1: Let J1D(I) be the total profit of set of attacked nodes I. Let U i be the node with a highest impact value in V 7: if TOTp + p( U i ) ::; budget then 8: Add U i into I 9:
TOTp +-TOTp + P(Ui )
:
V +-v -lFUi n {ud 12: Update nodes load for all nodes in V as Eg. 1 13 In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed method, the simulations were performed by using C++. In Section V-A, the scenario and the parameters used for the simulations were presented. In addition, the simulation results were provided in Section V-B.
A. Network Scenario and Parameters
Here, simulations were conducted to evaluate the performance of the PlEA. In the simulation, 1000 nodes were ER randomly distributed in a square area with side length 100. Initially, network is connected with Connection Probability is 210g~~:br;::0 o!o~::es) The weight of edges is randomly set from 0.01 to 1.00. In addition, f (u) and 5(u) for every nodes u are also randomly set from 1.00 to 1.20. Moreover, p(u) and p(u) are randomly set from 0.01 to 0.20.
To evaluate the performance, the Fully Adaptive Centrality (FAC) [24] was compared with the proposed algorithm PlEA in terms of the total profit. In PlEA, they evaluate "cascading potential" for every nodes based on the number of failed nodes and the total increase in load of the un-failed nodes. The following empirical data were obtained by averaging the data of 10 simulations. Fig. 1 shows the simulation results for the total profit of failed nodes versus the budget of network. Note that when the number of budget increases, the total profit of the failed nodes in both of PlEA and FAC increases. This is because more budgets in the network, the number of attacked nodes in PlEA or FAC can be increased, and the total profits of attacked node is therefore increased. Also note that the PlEA gets a higher profit than that of the FAC. This is because in FAC, there is no choice to continue attack other nodes if the total attacked cost over total budget. In contrast, in PlEA if the total cost over the total budget cased node with higher I P value, the next higher I P value. In addition, when the budget gets 50, it seems that the both PlEA and FAC are converging.
B. Total profits

VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of cascading failure for maximizing the total profit of attacked nodes in networks. We proposed an algorithm to get the most suitable list of attacked nodes for attacking. To evaluate the performance of PlEA, the FAC [24] was compared in terms of the total profits, where the FAC was also used to find the list of attacked nodes in the network. Simulation results showed that our proposed algorithm had better performance than the FAC that used a relevant impact matrix to construct the list of attacked nodes under limited budget. The total budgets 
